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 21. Introduction 
Korea has recorded one of the highest growth rates (6.60 %) of GDP in constant 
2000 prices among all national economies during the post-war period of 1953-2003. It 
had recorded negative growth in 1980 (-1.56 %) after the second oil crisis and in 1998 
(-7.13 %) after the Asian financial crisis. Except these two years, it has succeeded in 
achieving a remarkably high growth for five decades. The corresponding estimates in 
Korea’s Manufacturing sector during the period of 1953-2003 are the average annual 
growth rate of labour productivity in Manufacturing (6.15 %); the average annual 
growth rate of per capita capital in Manufacturing (7.12 %); and the growth rate of 
total factor productivity in Manufacturing (3.05%).   
Lucas (1993) has termed Korea’s episode of rapid growth as “economic 
miracle”. He suggested that we need a theory that incorporates the possibility of rapid 
growth episodes and that such theory should be able to explain why Korea 
experienced rapid growth since the mid-1960s while the Philippines experienced no 
such growth; although both economies started from roughly similar socio-economic 
conditions. Since then multiple theories of new growth have followed but they seem 
to have emphasized only a particular aspect of complex development and growth 
process, for example, externality, human capital, learning-by doing or threshold effect. 
Even though Lucas (1993) has observed that both the Philippines and South 
Korea started from “roughly similar socio-economic conditions”, the potential initial 
conditions were quite different between the two economies in the early 1960’s. First, 
while there was an extensive agricultural land reform in Korea on March 25, 1950 
five years after its independence from Japan in 1945, there was almost no significant 
agricultural land reform in the Philippines. While there was almost no large landlord 
class as a ruling class in Korea, there were large agricultural oligarchies in the 
Philippines. Second, there existed a significant difference in the state of income 
distribution between the two economies. According to World Bank, Social Indicators 
of Development 1988, the income received by highest 10 % of households in the 
Philippines were 40 % (1965) and 39 % (1975), while that in Korea was 28 % (1975). 
In terms of primary school enrolment rates, two economies were identically over 
100 % by 1965. But the enrolment rates of secondary and tertiary schools began to 
diverge from 1970’s. In the Philippines, the secondary school enrolment rate 
improved from 46 % in 1970 to 73 % in 1990 and the tertiary school enrolment rate 
 3increased from 3 % to 27 %. On the other hand in the Republic of Korea, two rates 
improved at much faster rates from 42 % to 87 % and from 16 % to 39 % respectively. 
Our explanation of a significant episode is based on two keywords: potential 
initial conditions and structural change and transformation. By potential initial 
conditions, we mean that we need to identify the state of initial conditions of the 
country not only by visible and quantifiable indicators but also by often-hidden 
indicators. These hidden indicators are so-called deep determinants (Rodrik et al., 
2002) typically of social, religious and political nature. Among the potential initial 
conditions, we argue that historical heritages which are often embodied in institutions 
and commercial practices are the most important determinants of productivity 
convergence through technological advancement because they ultimately shape policy 
environments and determine the success or failure of later development programs. 
In case of Korea, we can single out three such initial conditions among 
hundreds of potential list. The first is a colonial heritage that the primary school 
enrolment ratio was once increased from less than 5 percent to 30 percent level in 
1930’s. The second is the episode of an early land reform after independence before 
interest groups could be formed and allied. The third is the expansion of primary 
education in mid-1950’s under the influence of American mass-education system. The 
first and the third element combined formed the basis of what I define the two-tier 
system of human capital which is a unique historical heritage of Korea. 
          The  second  key  element  in explaining significant episodes of productivity 
change and convergence in Korea is the social capacity to transform from agriculture-
based economy to manufacturing one at earlier stage and from labor-intensive 
manufacturing to capital-intensive and technology-intensive manufacturing industries 
at later stages. Such a social capacity could exist as potential capacity unless some 
kind of development shock comes through. Naturally, it is this reason why the role of 
government is important because it can generate domestically a development shock or 
absorb a foreign shock and internalize it into a domestic one. 
The purpose of the paper is to identify and assess the role of technology in the 
long-run growth of Korea. Following Schumpeter (1942) and Solow (1956), we all 
know how important the technology is in economic development and growth. But it is 
very difficult to identify and assess its role in empirical terms because it is not directly 
observable. Most of times it is embodied in productive inputs or disembodied as   
neutral technical progress and shifts in total factor productivity. Based on productivity 
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technology in Manufacturing has played a key role in lifting up economy-wide 
productivity.  
            The  development  in  manufacturing technology has provided inter-industry 
spill-over effects to the primary and the tertiary industry. There were also intra-
industry spill-over effects within manufacturing from higher skill-intensive 
manufacturing to lower skill-intensive manufacturing, from capital-intensive 
production to labour-intensive production, and from export-promoted industries to 
import-substituting industries. We could also hypothesize and identify that most of 
manufacturing technologies have been embodied in imported machinery and 
equipments and reverse-migrated scientists and engineers. The learning-by-doing 
effect in Manufacturing seems to have played a crucial role in technological 
advancement and productivity convergence in the long-run growth of Korea. 
In what follows, we attempt to provide not another new growth theory but 
rather a significant episode of productivity convergence based on interaction between 
technological advancement and industrial restructuring and transformation. We 
attempt to provide a three-sector model with explicit consideration of learning by 
doing effect in manufacturing with its spill-over within manufacturing and across 
other sectors and to identify technical progress in three sectors through empirical 
observations of Korea during last four decades.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores a theoretical framework 
for the relationship between technology and productivity convergence and identifies 
the sectoral growth rates of technical progress by estimating CES production 
functions. Section 3 briefly reviews the productivity convergence by Korea and its 
sectoral composition. Section 4 provides some explanations for a rapid productivity 
convergence through technological advancement. Section 5 summarizes Korea’s 
technology policies in general. Section 6 concludes the paper.   
 
2. A Theoretical Framework and Empirical Identification of Sectoral Technical 
Progress 
 
              Following recent development in growth literature which emphasize sectoral 
composition associated with economic growth such as Baumol et al. (1989), 
 5Echevarria (1997), and Laitner (2000), we can define a representative consumer’s 
utility maximization as: 
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where   denotes the consumption of goods of sector j,   denotes the capital input 
of sector j, and    denotes the labor input of sector j and  technology and the 
production side of the economy are represented by the CES production function in 
order to allow for varying returns to scale and a more flexible pattern of factor 
substitutions. 
j C j K
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In CES specification, the parameter γ  is known as the “efficiency parameter”, 
the parameter δ as the “distribution parameter”, the parameter ν  as the “returns-to-
scale parameter”, and the parameter ρ  as the “substitution parameter” with the 
following inequality restrictions: 
 
                0 > j γ ,    1 0 < < j δ ,   0 > j ν ,  and     1 − > j ρ                                (2) 
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By using Taylor’s series approximation around  0 = ρ , and dropping the 
terms involving powers of ρ  higher than one, we obtain: 
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The parameters of (5) are related to the coefficients of (4) as follows: 
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Then the first order conditions of profit-maximizing firms can be derived as follows: 
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Formal proofs of the existence and uniqueness of the steady state for the model with 
Cobb-Douglas preferences have been presented in Echevarria (1997). The 
computational method proposed forces the economy with nonhomothetic preferences 
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preferences. 
The above model can have an equilibrium given an initial capital, K 
 
) , ( ) , , , , , , ( 1 3 2 , 1 3 2 , 1 3 2 , 1 + = t t t t t t t t t t t t K K x L L L K K K I C C C  
0 )) , ( ), , ( , , , ( 2 1 1 2 1 = + + + + + t t t t t t t k k x k k x k k k F      for t=0,…..,n-2 
0 )) , ( ), , ( , , , ( 1 1 = − − k k x k k x k k k F n n n n n   for t=n-1 
where   refers to the transformed value of the stock of capital at period t and k the 
transformed stock of capital of the steady state. 
t k
  
Empirical Identification of Technological Progress 
 
We have estimated the above sectoral CES production functions by adding time 
variable to estimate the rate of technical progress in each sector using Korean data 
from data base of Pyo (2001) and Pyo (2003) . The results are as follows: 
 
Table 3 Estimates of CES Production Function 
 Whole 
economy 
Primary Manufacturing Service 
-136.2380 -44.7535 -70.8019    -8.7452  Constant 
(51.1878) (16.2222) (12.1615)    (17.7559) 
0.5607 0.0434 0.4679    0.6933 
2 β  
(0.1751) (0.0782) (0.1224)    (0.0981) 
0.2152 0.1747 0.3491    0.0469 
3 β  
(0.2714) (0.2166) (0.1831)    (0.2037) 
-0.1001 -0.0164 -0.0028    -0.0282 
4 β  
(0.0446) (0.0184) (0.0194)    (0.0173) 
0.0705 0.0267 0.0369    0.0060  time 
(0.0259) (0.0092) (0.0064)    (0.0096) 
2 R   0.9995 0.9813 0.9994 0.9985
DW statistic  2.0202 1.9551 0.8835 0.4157
*Standard errors in parenthesis 
 
      Estimated rates of technical progress are 7.1 % (whole economy), 2.7 % (primary), 
3.7 % (manufacturing) and 0.6 % (service) respectively and statistically significant 
 8except the service sector. The technical progress in manufacturing seems to have 
generated economy-wide technical progress in a more accelerated fashion.  
 
From estimates of linearized CES production functions, we have calculated the 
CES parameters using the equations (6)~(9) as follows: 
 
Table 4. Estimates of Parameters of CES Production Function 
  Whole 
economy 
Primary Manufacturing Service 
Rate of Technical 
progress  0.0705 0.0267 0.0369 0.0060 
δ (distribution)  0.7226 0.1990 0.5727 0.9367 
ν  (returns to scale)  0.7759 0.2181 0.8169 0.7402 
ρ  (substitution)  1.2870 0.9407 0.0280 1.2837 
   
       As shown in above table, the hypothesis of constant returns to scale is rejected all 
of four specifications. The estimated substitution parameters are quite different among 
three sectors and the unitary elasticity of substitution implied in Cobb-Douglas 
specification is accepted in only the primary sector. 
 
3. Technology and Productivity Convergence in Korea: A Growth Accounting 
 
 The Productivity Convergence 
The World Penn-Table data indicates the following convergence of Korea’s 
labor productivity relative to US: 
 
Korea’s Labor Productivity relative to US 1953: 11.70 
Korea’s Labor Productivity relative to US 2000: 47.70 
 
It provides an episode of rapid productivity convergence: Korea’s per-capita 
income in 1961 was about 11.70 percent of US’ per-capita income but it reached to 


































The Aggregate Productivity Growth 
 
According to our growth accounting, the overall productivity performance of 
Korea during the period of 1953-2003 can be summarized in terms of average 
annual growth rates in 2000 constant price as follows: 
 
GDP growth (DY) = 6.60 %  Capital deepening (DKL) =7.08 % 
Labor productivity growth (DLP) = 3.60 %  TFP growth (DTFP) = -0.26 % 
 
In order to carry out a growth accounting, we need to estimate shares of factor 
income. The share of labor income in the aggregate economy estimated by the Bank 
of Korea shows an increasing trend from 1953 (0.24) to 1960 (0.36), 1980 (0.49) 
and 2000 (0.60). 
Since the Bank of Korea did not publish the labor income shares by industry 
before 1970, we have estimated those using the following equations: 
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As the figures 1,2, and 3 show, all the estimates reflect the similar time trend, 
but the estimates using the labor share in the whole economy( T α )  as independent 
variable(equations 5.3 and 5.4) seem to reflect the fluctuations in labor shares well 
during the period of 1970-2003. Therefore, we have used the equation (5.4). 
 






































































































Our estimate of labor income share in manufacturing shows also a steady 
upward trend but with some fluctuation from 1953 (0.39) to 1960 (0.50), 1980 
(0.63), 1996 (0.69) and 2003 (0.60). The reduction of labor income share from 1996 
to 2000 reflects the impact of the financial crisis in 1997 and is consistent with the 
worsened Gini coefficient of urban wage earners’ Household income. At the same 
time, it is a manifestation of factor price equalization theorem in the long-run that as 
a relatively labor-abundant country engages in free trade, the wage increases 
relative to price of capital; the free trade benefits the relatively abundant factor of 
the trading country. 
 
The decomposition of economy-wide aggregate growth accounting in per-
capita terms can be made as follows: 
 
DLP (3.60 %) = SK  × DKL (7.08 %) + DTFP (-0.26 %)                 (1) 
 
where SK is the average share of capital income in total GDP which is generated 
from (1 - share of employees’ compensation). 
Alternatively, the decomposition of GDP growth can be made as follows: 
 
DY (6.60 %) = SK × DK (10.11 %) + SL × DL (2.99 %) + DTFP (-0.26 %)    (2) 
 
 12where DK is the average growth rate of capital input, SL is the average share of labor 
income in total GDP and DL is the average growth rate of labor input. 
        
  Manufacturing Productivity Growth 
On the other hand, we have estimated corresponding estimates in Korea’s 
Manufacturing sector during the period of 1953-2003 as follows: 
 
DLPM (6.15 %) = SKM  × DKLM (7.11 %) + DTFPM (3.05 %)                 (3) 
 
where DLPM is the average annual growth rate of labor productivity in 
Manufacturing; SKM is the share of capital income in Manufacturing GDP; DKLM is 
the average annual growth rate of per capita capital in Manufacturing; and DTFPM is 
the growth rate of total factor productivity in Manufacturing. 
 
DYM(10.98%) = SKM×DKM(12.11%)+SLM×DLM(4.66%)+DTFPM(3.05%)  (4) 
 
where DYM is the average annual growth rate of real Manufacturing GDP; DKM is 
the growth rate of capital stock in Manufacturing; SLM is the average share of labor 
income in Manufacturing; and DLM is the growth rate of labor input in 
Manufacturing.   
The comparison of growth accounting between economy-wide aggregate one 
and Manufacturing sector reveals several characteristics in Korea’s productivity 
performance as follows: 
 
1)  The growth accounting at the economy-wide aggregate level over the period of 
1953-2003 in Korea has exhibited a capital-input driven growth rather than 
TFP-led growth confirming the Krugman(1994) proposition. The relative 
contribution of TFP growth to total GDP growth was slightly negative. It also 
confirms Nadiri’s (1972) proposition that relative contribution of TFP to output 
growth is small in developing economies as compared to its critical importance 
in industrialized economies. 
2)  The manufacturing sector in Korea has accumulated capital at a faster rate 
(12.11 %) than the aggregate economy (10.11 %) and has increased employment 
too at a faster rate (4.66 %) than the aggregate economy (2.99 %). Its growth 
 13rate in capital deepening (7.11 %) is almost the same as the economy-wide 
growth rate (7.08 %). But the relative contribution of TFP in manufacturing 
(27.8 %) is much more significant than that at the aggregate economy-wide level. 
Therefore, Korea’s rapid growth was manufacturing-led growth and the 
significant contribution of its TFP seemed to have exercised a spill-over effect 
into other sectors such as the primary sector and the service sector mitigating 
their lower TFP. 
3)  The generated average share of labor income in manufacturing (0.55) was 
higher than that in the aggregate economy (0.45) due to higher rates of growth 
in employment even though the average wage rate in manufacturing was lower 
than the rest of sectors. According to Korea National Statistical Office, the 
industrial differences in wages are as follows in 1980 and 2000 where index of 
Manufacturing wage is treated as base index (100): 
 
Therefore, we conclude: 
1) The growth accounting at the economy-wide aggregate level over the period of 
1953-2003 in Korea has exhibited a capital-input driven growth rather than TFP-led 
growth confirming the Krugman (1994) proposition. The relative contribution of TFP 
growth to total GDP growth during the period was slightly negative. It also confirms 
Nadiri’s (1972) proposition that relative contribution of TFP to output growth is small 
in developing economies as compared to its critical importance in industrialized 
economies. 
2) The manufacturing sector in Korea has accumulated capital at a faster rate 
(12.11 %) than the aggregate economy (10.11 %) and has increased employment too 
at a faster rate (6.10 %) than the aggregate economy (3.75 %). Its growth rate in 
capital deepening (7.12 %) is almost the same as the economy-wide growth rate 
(7.08 %). But the relative contribution of TFP in manufacturing (27.8 %) is much 
more significant than that at the aggregate economy-wide level.  
3)Therefore, Korea’s rapid growth was manufacturing-led growth and the significant 
contribution of its TFP seemed to have exercised a spill-over effect into other sectors 
such as the primary sector and the service sector mitigating their lower TFP. The 
generated average share of labor income
1 in manufacturing (0.55) was higher than 
                                                 
1 Since we have used employee compensation as labor income, it does not contain  
 14that in the aggregate economy (0.45) due to higher rates of growth in employment in 
earlier years even though the average wage rate in manufacturing was lower than the 
rest of sectors. 
Table 1 Growth Accounting Results (1953 ~2003) 
Year   Total  I  II  III 
1953-2003  Total Factor Productivity  -0.26  -6.72  3.05  -0.64 
  GDP  6.60  2.13 10.98 6.68 
  Labor  Input  2.99 -1.24 4.66 5.31 
  Capital  Input  10.11 9.75 12.11 9.74 
  Total Factor Input  6.86  8.85  7.92  7.33 
1953-1980  Total Factor Productivity  -1.70  -7.88  1.93  -1.34 
  GDP  6.51  2.40 13.21 6.80 
  Labor  Input  3.77 1.04 7.75 6.22 
 Capital  Input  10.75  10.67  14.85  9.92 
  Total Factor Input  8.21  10.28  11.28  8.14 
1981-2003  Total Factor Productivity  1.07  -6.65  4.09  -0.11 
  GDP  6.35 0.70 7.99 6.38 
  Labor  Input  2.01 -3.88 0.91 4.38 
  Capital  Input  9.45 8.86 9.01 9.62 
  Total Factor Input  5.29  7.36  3.89  6.49 
 
Table 2. Index of Industrial Differences in Wages 
                                              1980 2000 
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery  138.4  110.8 
Mining 145.4  106.7 
Manufacturing 100.0  100.0 
Electricity, Gas and Water  179.5  153.9 
Construction 197.2  108.1 
Wholesale, Retail, Restaurants and Hotels  139.1  95.7 
Transport, Storage and Communication  136.9  111.8 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate and Business Service  170.6  121.7 
Community, Social and Personal services  187.4  105.3 
Sources: Korea National Statistical Office, Social Indicators in Korea, 2001  
                                                                                                                                            
 
 15The wage differential between Manufacturing and Non-Manufacturing had 
been reduced from 1980 (100: 161.8) to 2000 (100: 114.2). There was a significant 
catch-up of Manufacturing wages to Non-Manufacturing wages level due to the 
changes into productivity-based compensation policy, strong union activity in 
Manufacturing and increase in skill-intensity in Manufacturing labor. 
The overall productivity trends at both the aggregate economy-wide level and 
Manufacturing level seem to suggest the growth of TFP may not seem significant in the 
aggregate sense but it played a crucial role indirectly through lifting up productivity of 
manufacturing sector.  
In summary, we can argue that in case of Korea, the growth of TFP may not 
seem significant in the aggregate sense but it played a crucial role indirectly through 
lifting up productivity of manufacturing sector. In particular, the growth in technical 
efficiency and technical change in manufacturing sector must have worked in two 
directions to lift up productivity in the rest of sectors: one is a direct effect to 
manufactures-user industries and the other is indirect effect of spillover and learning-
by-doing. For example, computer manufacturing and assembly causes lifting up the 
productivity of computer-using service industries and the computer manufacturing 
itself generates spillover effect and induces learning-by-doing to other industries’ 
manpower.  
 
4. Explanation of Rapid Productivity Convergence through Technological 
Advancement 
 
As pointed out by Lucas (1993), we need a growth theory that incorporates the 
possibility of rapid growth episodes and productivity convergence. No single theory 
could explain this episode because it involves more than growth of an aggregate 
economy; it should deal with complex story of development with late industrialization. 
It would be tempting to say that everything the Korean Government had done was 
appropriate and timely and that the interaction between government and market in 
Korea was well-coordinated. However, a careful examination of the past development 
history of Korea reveals that there had been pros and cons and ups and downs and that 
the episode of fast growth had been far from being smooth. The Korean economy had to 
go through very turbulent periods as witnessed in 1980-1981 following the second oil 
 16crisis and the assassination of President Park and 1997-1998 in the middle of Asian 
financial crisis. 
 
We can explain the Korean experience of rapid productivity convergence through 
three stages. During the First stage (1962-1976) of economic development, the Park 
government adopted a vent-for-surplus type development strategy. The First Five-Year 
Development period (1962-1966) can be characterized as a period of explosive export 
growth. Export amount in current US dollars increased from 54.8 million dollars in 
1962 to 253.7 million dollars by about five times. Helped by extraordinary export 
performance, the annual average GDP growth rate increased at 8.5 percent exceeding 
the target rate (7.1 %). In general, it was a period when nationalistic movement was 
very high. The foreign direct investments did not receive much credit due to strong anti-
Japanese sentiment and therefore, the Park government opted for inducing project loans 
from Asian Development Bank and World Bank and using them for basic industries 
such as steel and cement and social infrastructure such as highways and railroads and 
power plants etc. Most of private projects were awarded to private firms usually to 
qualified conglomerates through Korea Development Bank, Korea Export Import Bank, 
Korea Medium and Small Enterprise Bank and other commercial banks through 
syndicated loans or government-subsidized policy loans. For getting next-round loans, 
one of the most important criteria was export performance by the loan-awarded 
companies.  
Both the government and banks were monitoring the company’s performance. 
This criterion of export-performance had exercised a constant pressure on private 
firms and their owners and entrepreneurs so that they were almost obsessed with how 
to sell their products in overseas market. Even though there must have been a lot of 
distortion effect, the explicit criterion of export priority had reduced the arbitrariness 
by bureaucrats and bankers and had made the monitoring system relatively more 
transparent than that under import substitution system. 
Entering the second stage (1977-1986), Korean economy experienced the 
second oil crisis in early 1980’s and had to go through restructuring the past 
investments in heavy and chemical industries made during late 1970’s. But it was this 
period when major conglomerates such as Samsung, Lucky Goldstar (LG) and 
Hyundai started investing in semi-conductor industries because they anticipated the 
technology frontier in that industry and the government wanted to promote 
 17competition in the industry. During this period Korean government has moved from 
direct industrial support policy to indirect support policy. For example, they tried to 
shift the paradigm of industrial promotion from directly subsidizing an industry such 
as steel or automobile to indirectly promoting investments in energy saving, 
preserving environments and introducing new technologies through enhanced R&D 
programs. It was also a period in which trade liberalization before capital market 
opening was seriously deliberated as a backdrop against rising wages and unionism. 
The Third stage (1987-2003) is characterized by turbulent transition from 
authoritarian regime to a more democratic one. It is a period in which Korea had 
pursued import liberalization and capital market opening by joining WTO and OECD. 
It was a period when Korean conglomerates engaged in excess competition in a 
pattern of monopolistic competition across industries. Many of them had invested in 
pre-emptive investment projects in non-tradable sectors to stay alive against 
increasing foreign and domestic competition. The monitoring system by both 
government and banks became less transparent and a lax financial supervision created 
a vast network of moral hazard. It was also the period of rapidly declining rates of 
return on capital in Korea as observed. As Independent Evaluation Office of IMF had 
described it, the Korean financial crisis of 1997 was a twin crisis; foreign exchange 
crisis and domestic credit crunch. During the post-crisis IMF programs, there were 
both corporate and financial restructuring and about two-thirds of top-30 
conglomerates went bankrupt. But toward the end of this stage, Korean economy was 
affected by New Economy and IT revolution. There was substitution of investments 
from conventional non-IT sectors to IT sectors but the employment absorption by IT 
sectors was rather weak and once IT boom was over by 1999, the investment became 
quite stagnant casting doubt on new sources of sustainable growth for Korean 
economy as analyzed in Pyo and Ha (2004) (2005). 
 In summary, the episode of rapid productivity convergence in Korea was made 
possible by successful adoption of development strategy based on incremental 
comparative advantage and industrial restructuring by the government initiative. It 
was a consequence of interaction between market forces and government intervention. 
 
Major Determinants of Productivity and Technological Advancement 
Our explanation of significant episode of rapid productivity convergence by 
Korea is based on two keywords: potential initial conditions and structural change and 
 18transformation. By potential initial conditions, I mean that we need to identify the 
state of initial conditions of the country not only by visible and quantifiable indicators 
but also by often-hidden indicators. These hidden indicators are so-called deep 
determinants (Rodrik et al., 2002) typically of social, religious and political nature. 
Among the potential initial conditions, I argue that historical heritages which are often 
embodied in institutions and commercial practices are the most important determinant 
because they ultimately shape policy environments and determine the success or 
failure of later development programs. 
          In  case  of  Korea,  we  can single out three such initial conditions among 
hundreds of potential list. The first is a colonial heritage that the primary school 
enrollment ratio was once increased from less than 5 percent to 30 percent level in 
1930’s. The second is the episode of an early land reform after independence before 
interest groups could be formed and allied. The third is the expansion of primary 
education in mid-1950’s under the influence of American mass-education system. The 
first and the third element combined formed the basis of what I define the two-tier 
system of human capital which is a unique historical heritage of Korea. 
Among numerous determinants which must have mutually interacted, I would 
rate human capital determined by historical precondition as the most important 
determinant without hesitation. The enlargement of primary education and upward 
mobility in education system are the key elements in improving nation’s stock of 
human capital. The human capital enhances knowledge, absorptive capacity, 
indigenous R&D efforts, and institutional environments. 
Even though Lucas (1993) has observed that both the Philippines and South 
Korea started from “roughly similar socio-economic conditions”, the potential initial 
conditions were quite different between the two economies in the early 1960’s. First, 
while there was an extensive agricultural land reform in Korea on March 25, 1950 
five years after its independence from Japan in 1945, there was almost no significant 
agricultural land reform in the Philippines. While there was almost no large landlord 
class as a ruling class in Korea, there were large agricultural oligarchies in the 
Philippines. Second, there existed a significant difference in the state of income 
distribution between the two economies. According to World Bank, Social Indicators 
of Development 1988, the income received by highest 10 % of households in the 
Philippines were 40 % (1965) and 39 % (1975), while that in Korea was 28 % (1975). 
In terms of primary school enrollment rates, two economies were identically near 
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diverge from 1970’s. In the Philippines, the secondary school enrollment rate 
improved from 46 % in 1970 to 73 % in 1990 and the tertiary school enrollment rate 
increased from 3 % to 27 %. On the other hand in the Republic of Korea, two rates 
improved at much faster rates from 42 % to 87 % and from 16 % to 39 % respectively. 
The second key element in explaining significant episodes of productivity  
change and convergence in Korea is the social capacity to transform from agriculture-
based economy to manufacturing one at earlier stage and from labor-intensive 
manufacturing to capital-intensive and technology-intensive manufacturing industries 
at later stages. Such a social capacity could exist as just a potential capacity and could 
never materialize in many developing countries unless some kind of development 
shock comes through. Naturally, it is this reason why the role of government is 
important because it can generate domestically a development shock or absorb a 
foreign shock and internalize it into a domestic one. For example, on May 16, 1961, a 
military coup staged by President Park had generated a domestic development shock 
because the military group had to build their own legitimacy by providing the public 
with blueprints of economic development. On the other hand the sudden reduction of 
US aid in early 1960s had caused economic hardship but had generated an external 
shock to make the Korean people aware of the fact that they cannot live on foreign 
aids forever and therefore, they need their own indigenous effort of rebuilding 
national economy. 
(1) Adoption of New Technology 
As in many developing countries, Korea relied on imported foreign technology 
to carry out construction and operation of major manufacturing facilities. At the 
beginning stage, the imported technology came in the form of machineries and 
equipments mostly from the United States and Japan. The operation manuals by the 
Japanese producers could be well-interpreted because there were many senior 
engineers who were trained in the colonial period. One of the reasons why the 
Japanese machines and equipments were popular at the beginning stage of 
development is this familiarity with the system and know-how. Another reason is easy 
access to after-service because of the proximity to Japan. As the engineers and 
scientists trained in late 1950’s and 1960’s from the United States started returning 
home in late 1960’s and 1970’s, their familiarity with US machines and equipments 
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equipments. 
The R&D and technology imports are two important windows of technology 
adoption in many developing countries. But the success of late industrialization 
ultimately depends on the country’s indigenous technological capacity to absorb new 
technologies at the right time. In general, technology buyers in developing countries 
are given multiple choices of different technologies by technology sellers in advanced 
countries for a given plant construction or processing know-how. Usually the choice 
of the right technology at the right price and at the right timing is the most crucial part 
to the success of the project. And without indigenous technological capacity, 
industries in developing countries can not make optimal choice of technology. 
 
In case of Korea, this role of choosing the right technology at the right time was 
left to entrepreneurs and engineers not to bureaucrats. Most of engineers have been 
foreign-educated and consulted domestic R&D centers to acquire knowledge on 
technology in question. In other words, the indigenous technological capacity itself 
was a human capital. 
Even though it is difficult to identify statistically the growth of indigenous 
technological capacity, the patent statistics can provide us with one source of 
indicators. According to statistics compiled by Korea Patent Office, the number of 
patent applications increased exponentially from 1948 (169 cases) to 1960 (611 cases), 
1980 (5,070 cases) and 2003 (118,652 cases) as shown in Table 4. The composition 
by applicant’s nationality is as follows: 1948 (Korean 100%), 1960 (Korean 89.2 %, 
USA 2.7 %, West Germany 1.6 %), 1980 (Korean 24.5%, USA 22.7 %, Japan 
32.0 %) and 1997 (Korean 72.6 %, USA 7.9 %, Japan 12.0 %, Germany 2.5 %). In 
summary, Japan and United States have been two dominant foreign patent applicants 
but Korean share which was once declined to the level of 24.5 % in 1980 has been 
kept up at over 70 % level in mid-1990’s. It is one indication of indigenous 







Table 4. Number of Patent Applications by Year 
Classification Patents  Utility 
Models Subtotal Designs Trade-
marks  Total 
1947 236  237 473 23   496
1948 169  166 335 38   373
1949 233  229 462 46   508
1950 126  123 249 30 599  878
1951 30  29 59 3 40  102
1952 91  69 160 19 151  330
1953 76  152 228 62 229  519
1954 132  175 307 76 375  758
1955 156  281 437 216 465  1118
1956 287  494 781 179 1087  2047
1957 469  758 1227 276 1469  2972
1958 555  1105 1660 358 1439  3457
1959 703  1395 2098 362 1307  3767
1960 611  1207 1818 329 1209  3356
1961 858  1683 2541 470 1665  4676
1962 782  1793 2575 570 1890  5035
1963 771  1790 2561 729 1295  4585
1964 908  2244 3152 804 1845  5801
1965 1018  2849 3867 825 2053  6745
1966 1060  3252 4312 1338 2752  8402
1967 1177  3594 4771 1919 3228  9918
1968 1463  5129 6592 3277 6619  16488
1969 1701  5573 7274 4536 9111  20921
1970 1846  6167 8013 4522 5124  17659
1971 1906  6810 8716 5348 5816  19880
1972 1995  7747 9742 5991 6878  22611
1973 2398  7561 9959 6333 9562  25854
1974 4455  6833 11288 6220 9053  26561
1975 2914  7290 10204 6707 9476  26387
1976 3261  8378 11639 6018 11037  28694
1977 3139  7601 10740 5520 9415  25675
1978 4015  6645 10660 6265 12040  28965
1979 4722  7957 12679 8371 13789  34839
1980 5070  8558 13628 10075 13558  37261
1981 5303  9064 14367 10394 15755  40516
1982 5924  10669 16593 11902 19537  48032
1983 6394  11485 17879 13947 23982  55808
1984 8633  14765 23398 15870 24764  64032
1985 10587  18548 29135 18949 26069  74153
1986 12759  22401 35160 18731 28031  81922
1987 17062  24773 41835 20231 30762  92828
1988 20051  22677 42728 18162 34681  95571
1989 23315  21530 44845 18196 39832  102873
 221990 25820  22654 48474 18769 46826  114069
1991 28132  25895 54027 20097 46612  120736
1992 31073  28665 59738 22948 45124  127810
1993 36491  32218 68709 27568 59593  155870
1994 45712  39806 85518 29033 72581  187132
1995 78499  59866 138365 29978 71852  240195
1996 90326  68822 159148 29859 85062  274069
1997 92734  45809 138543 28491 87065  254099
1998 75188  28896 104084 23732 57393  185209
1999 80642  30650 111292 32404 87332  231028
2000 102010  37163 139173 33841 110073  283087
2001 104612  40804 145416 36867 107137  289420
2002 106136  39193 145329 37587 107876  290792
2003 118652  40825 159477 37607 108917  306001
Total 1175388  813052 1988440 643018 1481432  4112890
Source: The Korean Intellectual Property Office 
 
There are two additional indicators for the development of indigenous 
technological capacity. One is the status of national technical certificates and the other 
is the status of vocational training. According to Ministry of Labor‘s Yearbook of 
Labor Statistics, total national technical certificate holders increased from 122,833 
persons in 1978 to 541,544 persons in 2000. The composition by kinds of national 
certificates was Craftsman (54.8 %), Industrial Engineer (24.6 %), Assistant 
Craftsman (11.9 %), Engineer (8.5 %) and Professional Engineer (0.3 %) in 1978. It 
changed in 2000 to Craftsman (78.0 %), Industrial Engineer (10.2 %), Assistant 
Craftsman (2.2 %), Engineer (9.0 %), Professional Engineer (0.4 %) and Master 
Craftsman (0.1 %). It indicates while professional engineers and engineers certificate 
holders did not increase  much in recent years because the market demand for their 
service is limited, the supply of craftsman certificate holders increased significantly 
both in numbers and in shares. 
 
(2) Research and Development 
 
It is well-known that increased spending on R&D can lead to discovery of new 
technologies or development of new products that contribute to higher productivity. 
But in many developing countries, R&D can be wasted because of lack in 
infrastructure of R&D and motivation for indigenous R&D effort. Korea was no 
exception. It was only after experiencing two-rounds of oil crisis and the first year of 
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regime had realized the limitation of extensive growth based on factor accumulation 
and capacity expansion under the so-called “ Heavy and Chemical Industrialization 
Policy ” and started to seek for new sources of growth. According to MCI, the policy 
targets announced in February 1982 included export promotion with enhanced value-
added, the upgrading and rationalizing of industrial structure and enhancement of 
industrial competitiveness through maintaining balanced growth among different 
sectors. 
Most of R&D policies were formulated by Ministry of Science and Technology 
(MOST) in consultation with Economic Planning Board (EPB) and Ministry of 
Commerce and Industry (MCI) so that there was check and balance among ministries 
on R&D expenditure. By the end of March 1982, MOST has selected a total of 108 
Special R&D Projects which will be carried out by 80 private firms (a total of 7.2 
million US dollars) and 28 government research institutions or enterprises (a total of 
18.7 million US dollars). 
In June 1982, MOST has announced Five-Year R&D Plan for Fine Chemical 
Industries selecting 200 projects in five areas of specialization (a total of 62.8 million 
US dollars of private funds and 77.5 million US dollars of government funds). In 
February 1984, the government announced a plan to promote basic R&D to co-fund 
with the private sector a total of 100 million US dollars by 1988. In March of the 
same year, Ministry of Finance had announced to provide R&D Funds to not only 
hardware manufacturers but also software manufacturers. In September, the Bank of 
Korea announced to increase financial support to Small and Medium Industries (SMI) 
who adopt technology innovation plans and new technology development. 
In January 1985, Ministry of Finance announced an ambitious plan of 
mobilizing a total of 243.7 million US dollars as R&D funds from five financial 
institutions for technology development including Korea Development Bank (KDB) 
and National Investment Fund (NIF). In August 1986, MCI announced a plan to 
support software industries by funding through Industrial Development Fund (IDF) as 
infant industries in order to prepare for import liberalization and intellectual property 
rights issue. On the other hand, MOST announced a plan to spend a total of 126.2 
million US dollars as Special R&D Expenditure in three representative technology-
intensive frontier industries: Fine Chemical, Semi-Conductor and New Material 
Industries. 
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are in need of urgent R&D projects (837 cases) and announced to support those 
selected R&D projects to be completed in two years by 1988. 
One of the maintained hypotheses that I would propose is that the main R&D 
activities in Korea were pioneered by the first generation of scientists and engineers 
who have been educated and trained from the United States and Europe. They include 
the founding members of KAIST and Korea Defense Research Institute etc. Since at 
that time, private firms R&D facilities were fragile and often lacked the right 
equipment and facilities and financial compensations were also low. Therefore, the 
bulk of major scientists and engineers preferred the government think-tanks. It was 
only in the 1990s when the prestigious private R&D centers run by major 
conglomerates could offer better salaries and non-salary remunerations. 
R&D activities at both government and private sector level needs to be assessed. 
In general, R&D expenditure can be decomposed into two categories; public R&D 
and private R&D. In case of Korea, the role of public R&D was dominant at the 
beginning of its development plan in 1960s. However, public R&D could not satisfy 
technology and engineering demand by private firms as the industrial structure is 
transformed from light industries to heavy and chemical industries during 1970’s. The 
private R&D which was motivated by various tax incentives by the government had 
been oriented toward more application and adaptation technologies and engineering 
know-how. Therefore, there seem to have been a complementary relationship between 
public R&D and private R&D during 1960s and 1970s in Korea.  
On the other hand, the role of private R&D started to dominate public R&D in 
Korea from mid-1980’s when Korea’s industrial policy shifted from direct industry-
specific support policy to indirect functional support policy. It was also the time when 
major Korean conglomerates started investing semi-conductors, higher-value added 
steel and metal products, and machinery and equipments including automobiles. In 
the 1990’s, the public R&D played an important role in telecommunication industries. 
For example, ETRI (Electronic Telecommunication Research Institute) and KISDI 
(Korean Information Society Development Institute) are representative examples. 
And public R&D and private R&D started having not only complementary elements 
but also competitive elements. 
The differential role of public R&D and private R&D in the evolution of 
Korea’s R&D policy needs to be carefully examined and its relationship with 
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to Ministry of Science and Technology and Electronics and Telecommunications 
Research Institute, the R&D expenditure on Information and Telecommunication has 
occupied 20 percent of total R&D expenditure and 0.39 percent of GDP in 1991 but 
increased by 2000 to 49.2 percent and 1.32 percent level respectively. The sector’s 
R&D expenditure was decomposed between public and private by the ratio of 18 
percent and 82 percent respectively in 1991 but changed to the ratio of 10 percent and 
90 percent in 2000. 
The overall trend in R&D expenditure shows a remarkable upward trend both in 
terms of absolute amount being put in and the relative share to GDP as shown in 
appendix Table. The total expenditure increased from 1.2 billion Won (0.24 % of 
GDP) in 1963 to 13,848 billion Won (2.67 % of GDP) in 2000. The sustained 
productivity growth was made possible by building up its own indigenous 
technological capacity through division of work between public R&D and private 
R&D. 
The number of R&D institutes increased from 72 in 1963 to 2,856 in 1996 and 
R&D manpower increased from 1,750 persons to 132,023 persons during the same 
period. In 1996, 11.7 percent of R&D manpower was with research institutes, 34.3 
percent was with universities and the remaining 54 percent was with private firms. 
The decomposition of R&D expenditure by function shows: basic R&D (18.2 %), 
applied R&D (28.9 %) and product development (53.0 %) in 1983 and basic R&D 
(12.6 %), applied R&D (24.3 %) and product development (63.1 %) in 2000 as shown 
in Appendix Table. The relative weight of R&D expenditure in product development 
became larger than basic or applied R&D expenditure in recent years. It indicates the 
private R&D expenditure has become more important than public R&D and Korea’s 
R&D has become more commercially oriented expenditure. 
 
(3) Technology Transfer 
 Regarding technology import policy, Korea has adopted the promotion of R&D 
and technology import as a prime policy to enhance productivity increase which can 
be linked to a good export performance. Korea’s development strategy from the very 
beginning of 1960’s aimed at inducing syndicate loans from World Bank, Asian 
Development Bank, and commercial banks and then, reallocated them to project-
qualified companies through government controlled banks such as Korea 
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Import Bank, etc. Therefore, the role of direct foreign investment was relatively 
insignificant, which was different from the development strategies of Singapore, 
Hong Kong, and Taiwan.  
Under the system, the project-awarded qualified companies had to meet the 
government standard of export performance and cost-benefit requirements by 
substantially improving productivity performance. They have had relatively little time 
for endogenous R&D effort and had to rely on imported technology. Most of imported 
technology had been in the form of imported know-how and manuals which come 
with the purchase of imported machinery and equipments. Later on most of imported 
technologies were in the form of purchased licensing agreements and intellectual 
property rights. But most of firms had to invest in minimum R&D in order to build 
their own technology-adoption capacity typically by building their own laboratories 
and sending their engineers abroad for further training. Indigenous R&D came much 
later as most of firms have accumulated enough level of adoption technology. 
Therefore, the government policy aiming at promotion of R&D and liberal technology 
import policy must have affected positively on the productivity performance of 
project-awarded firms. 
According to Science and Technology Yearbook by the Ministry of Science and 
Technology, the number of technology import cases reported was 285 cases during 
1967-1971: Electrical & Electronics (65 cases), Refinery & Chemical (59 cases) and 
Machinery (58 cases) among other industries. The number increased sharply during 
the period of Korea’s investment in heavy and chemical industries (1972-1976) to a 
total of 434 cases: Machinery (116 cases), Refinery and Chemical (85 cases) and 
Electrical & Electronics (84 cases). However, as the Korean economy started to 
increase investment for technology intensive sectors such as semi-conductors and IT 
sectors from mid-1980’s the industrial composition also changed. The total number of 
technology import cases (5,830 cases) during the period of 1985-1996 is decomposed 
as Electrical and Electronics (2,016 cases, 34.6 %), Machinery (1,714 cases, 29.4 %) 
and Refinery & Chemical (979 cases, 16.8 %). 
In terms of statistics on technology licensing payments by countries, the United 
States was dominant donor country during 1962-1966 with 0.5 million US$ (71.4 %) 
out of a total of 0.7 million US$. After the diplomatic relationship with Japan was 
restored in mid-1960’s, Japan became the second largest technology supplier: During 
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States (11.0 million US$, 41.4 %) and Japan (10.5 million US$, 39.5 %). In 1996 just 
before the financial crisis of 1997, the total technology fee payment reached a record 
high level of 2,297.2 million US$ with the decomposition by the United States 
(1,160.0 million US$, 50.5 %) and Japan (723.9 million US$, 31.5 %). So the United 
States and Japan continued to be two dominant suppliers of technology to Korean 
industries. 
 
Three Channels of Technological Advancement 
(1) Human Capital 
In terms of human capital accumulation, we should note a remarkable feature in 
the history of modern Korea. That is the introduction of mass-education in primary 
schools at unprecedented rates and at the time of starvation and political unrest. 
According to Kimura (1986), the overall primary enrolment ratio for boys in 1911 
was 15.2-19.1 percent at the end of Yi Dynasty. And a survey of national illiteracy 
conducted by the colonial government as part of population census in 1930 showed 
the overall illiteracy rates of 50.4 percent for males and 89.8 percent for females.  
The primary school enrolment ratio, which has been frequently used as a proxy 
for human capital in recent growth literature, had been lifted up twice remarkably in 
modern history of Korea. The first jump occurred during 1930’s after the Colonial 
Government of Imperial Japan had adopted a conciliatory policy to integrate Koreans 
into mainland Japanese. They started introducing the Japanese system of education in 
place of traditional apprenticeship-like Korean system called Seodang. By 1940, the 
primary school enrolment ratio ascended to about 60 percent and 30 percent for boys 
and girls respectively.  But a survey conducted by the post-colonial government in 
1945 found that 77 percent of adults over 13 years old still did not have the skills of 
reading and writing in Korean language, Hangul. The US military government and the 
succeeding Rhee government had to make intensive efforts to eradicate adult illiteracy. 
The second jump occurred around 1957 when the Rhee government started 
introducing American system of mass education and the primary school enrollment 
ratio had ascended to 70 % level without too much differential between boys and girls. 
By 1960, the primary school enrolment ratio had reached 99.8 percent level as 
shown in Appendix Table. However, the composition of population by educational 
attainment (25 years old and over) in 1966 shows that 79.6 percent of population were 
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over. Thus the initial condition of educational attainment in Korea in 1960’s can be 
summarized as the vast expansion of primary education with very limited higher 
education. On the other hand, Korea has adopted education policy in which public 
education plays greater role in primary and secondary education than in tertiary 
education. The college-level education was left for competition between public and 
private colleges and universities. 
The hypothesis that I put forward here is that the beneficiaries of mass education 
in the 1930’s have become manager classes and those of mass education in the 1950’s 
have become major force of production and office workers in the later development 
periods of 1960’s and 1970’s. This seemingly two-tier system of human capital has 
been the core of Korea’s success in late industrialization, which distinguishes itself 
from other developing countries. 
As shown in Appendix Table A4, the composition of population of 25 years old 
and over by educational attainment show: Primary School Graduates and under 
(79.6%), Middle School Graduates (11.1 %), High School Graduates (5.6 %) and 
college Graduates and over (3.7 %) in 1966 and the corresponding rates became 
23.0 %, 13.3 %, 39.4 % and 24.3 % in 2000. So the fast and large-scale expansion of 
primary school education in the late 1950’s has been instrumental to developing 
indigenous R&D capacity, enhancing technology adoption skills and building up 
human capital through advances into higher education. 
As I have shown in Pyo (1998), the role of human capital in Korea in its earlier 
development stage was as a productive input rather than as accumulated knowledge to 
provide externality. The growth miracle of South Korea is not a miracle but the result 
of sustained accumulation and use of human capital. 
Another stylized fact to be observed is that the ratios of human capital (H) and 
physical capital (K) in Japan and Korea have increased over time but have not reached 
yet the level of United States which had been maintained at the range of .95-1.0 
during 1947-1969 according to Kendrick (1976). Estimates by Pyo and Jin (2000) 
showed that the ratio of Japan had peaked in 1990 at .65 but started to decline to the 
level of .62 by 1996. The estimate by Pyo (1993) showed that the ratio of Korea had 
peaked in 1976 but declined to the level of .40 by 1990. If we regard the ratio of 
United States as a benchmark ratio of human capital and physical capital which 
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can exhibit threshold externalities implied in endogenous growth theory. 
    The  consideration  of  human  capital  in addition to physical capital would be 
especially meaningful if we regard the costs associated with the installation and the 
demolition of capital as important determinants for a long-run growth path. As Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (2004) outlines, the adjustment costs would be especially important 
for increase in human capital through the process of education because the learning 
experience fundamentally takes time and attempts to accelerate the educational 
process are likely to encounter rapidly diminishing rates of return. 
    The consideration of human capital in addition to physical capital provides us with 
important implications on the speed of productivity convergence. In the course of 
economic development, per-capita human capital stock can be relatively high at the 
outset if the economies were particularly endowed with rich tradition of educational 
investment and historical infra-structure. But the fall in the ratio of human capital to 
physical capital over time would ultimately cause diminishing returns to per-capita 
physical capital to set in faster than otherwise. Therefore, the speed of convergence 
would be greater in the economy which enjoyed the higher shadow price of human 
capital than in the economy which did not enjoy the higher shadow price of human 
capital. I suppose that the East Asian economies may belong to the former category so 
that the current stagnation may reflect the phenomenon of diminishing returns to 
physical capital as the accumulation of human capital did not catch up. 
(2) Labor Supply 
Considering the unfavorable initial conditions such as lack of natural resources, 
high population density, existing twin gaps  and war-devastated socio-economic 
infrastructures by early 1960’s, Korean government had to rely on relatively abundant 
labor force to start up its engine for late development from 1962. 
Other than educational indicators, the initial conditions in Korea around early 
1960’s were far from being favorable. The unemployment rate was high (8.1 %) in 
1963 and the dominant portion (63.0 %) of population were still left at Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fishing. Since the primary sector’s production share in 1963 GDP was 
only 43.4 percent, the economy was being dominated by a low-productivity primary 
sector. 











































Sources: Pyo and Jin (2000) 
The employment statistic by industry shows a typical pattern of rural-urban 
migration and primary-manufacturing shift during the period of 1960-1974. As the 
economy passed the Lewisian turning point and the period of unlimited supply of 
labor was over around 1974, the unemployment rate was reduced from 8.1 percent in 
1963 to 5 percent level in 1974. The proportion of employed persons in the primary 
sector declined very fast from 63 percent in 1963  to 34.0 percent in 1980 and 10.9 
percent in 2000 while that of manufacturing increased fast between 1963 and 1980 
from 7.9 percent to 21.6 percent but remained flat until 2000 (20.2 %). 
The shift in labor supply from the primary sector to the secondary sector was 
made possible by various tax and subsidy incentives provided to manufacturing 
export industries. For example, there were tax incentives and at times subsidies in the 
construction of dormitory housing for plant workers and in the supply of wages-in-
kind such as free or low-cost meals and clothing etc. Many elementary workers 
particularly women employees found the dormitory life safer and more convenient 
with modern facilities such as TV sets and refrigerators. Of course, the primary 
motivation of the labor shift came from higher wages and salaries in manufacturing 
and the job security. In the primary sector of agriculture and fishery, there were wide-
spread disguised unemployment and the employment in the sector was very much 
cyclical and seasonal so that rural workers started dreaming of obtaining secured 
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fear of urban employment by migrated workers from rural area. 
 
In summary, the pattern of labor supply in Korea during last four decades can be 
characterized as follows. At the first stage (1960-1974), the vent-for-surplus type 
quantity of labor supply helped by the rapid expansion of primary education has 
dominated the scene. Also at this stage, the shift from the primary sector to the 
secondary sector was made being helped by rural-urban migration. Then in the second 
stage (1975-1987) there was major intra-industrial labor shift within manufacturing 
from labor intensive manufacturing to heavy and chemical manufacturing as shown in 
Row 8 of the Appendix Table. In the third stage (1988-2000), as the Korean economy 
moved into a more information and technology intensive structure and service-
oriented economy, quality of labor rather than quantity of labor became more 
important than before.   
  
 (3) Physical Capital  
 The rate of growth in physical capital in Korea during last four decades is truly 
an unprecedented one. UNIDO estimate of 11.21 percent is quite similar to my own 
estimate of 11.39 percent even though the method of estimation is different. I have 
used the polynomial benchmark equation method linking four benchmark years’ data 
rather than perpetual estimation method assuming 13.3 percent depreciation rate. My 
estimates of economic depreciation rate for the aggregate capital stock were lower 
than 13.3 percent; 9.4 percent during 1977-1987 and 7.8 percent during 1987-1997. 
The growth rate in Korea was higher than the growth rate (10.3 %) of gross 
capital stock in Japan in its high growth period (1964-1985) and that of net stock in 
Taiwan(1960-1987) as I noted in Pyo (1996, Table 4). Such a rapid accumulation of 
physical capital can be made possible under the two conditions. One is a sustained 
continuation of high rates of return and the other is a continued rise in savings rate in 
particular private savings rate. As observed in Pyo and Nam (1999), Korea’s before-
tax gross rate of return (gross operating surplus/ gross capital stock) was as high as 
33.7 % in 1971 higher than Japan’s gross rate of return (31.2 %), which led Harberger 
to term two economies as “outliers”. At the same time, two economies had maintained 
higher than OECD average savings rate. Even though both Japan and Korea 
experienced the rapid decline of rate of return from 1975 and from 1985 respectively 
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met these two conditions for the rapid accumulation of physical capital. 
The high rates of return in Korea during the 1970’s and the1980’s was made 
possible by the combination of two factors. One factor was the relative suppression on 
labor movement and wage increase and the continued incentive for internal corporate 
retained earnings through low-dividend policy. The other factor was households’ 
preference for higher savings and lower consumption for educational purpose and 
investment in housing to guard themselves from hyper-inflation.  
The expansion of primary education during late 1950’s had opened up the 
possibility of moving up the ladder of higher education for many beneficiaries of 
primary education.  They had been taught about the virtue of savings for higher 
education and for securing housing. The private savings rate in 1960 was only 5 
percent but has more than doubled within a decade and more than tripled within two 
decades. The gross savings rate increased from 9.0 percent level in 1960 to 18 percent 
level in 1970, 24.4 percent in 1980 and 32.4 percent in 2000. The domestic gross 
investment ratio started off at 10.0 percent level in 1960 but increased fast to the level 
of 36.2 percent in 1980 exceeding gross domestic savings rate but reduced to the level 
of 28.3 percent in 2000. The sustainable productivity growth over four decades since 
1960 in Korea was made possible by the sustained growth of gross domestic savings 
particularly private domestic savings, which were channeled into sustained domestic 
investment. Otherwise, Korea might have experienced foreign debt problem as many 
Latin American countries in the 1980’s. 
According to Economic Planning Board’s Main Economic Indicators (1980), 
out of total gross domestic capital formation (100%) the share of government savings 
declined from 37.8 percent in 1960 to 19.4 percent in 1979 while the share of 
households’ and non-profit organizations’ savings increased from – 16.9 percent to 
29.2 percent. Williamson (1977) pointed out that Korean households’ financial 
savings were low because of low interest rate policy by the government and high 
inflation rates thus making real interest rate low. However, they saved in the form of 
housing without mortgage loans and other forms of savings in non-financial 
intermediaries. 
The allocation of capital through credit control and policy loan schemes in 
earlier period and more liberalized financial system in later period must have 
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closely monitored by both government and banks controlled by government. 
 
5. Technology Policy in Korea 
The fruits of knowledge which is frequently hidden and intangible by its nature 
have been important determinant in Korea’s productivity growth. The stock of 
knowledge at the beginning stage of development plans was very shallow such that it 
did not reach to the threshold level where externality can be put into effect. 
The policy direction by the Korean government during the period of 1953-1961 
was the promotion of import-substituting manufacturing by means of allocation of 
foreign exchange earned through foreign aid. Therefore, there was very little aspect of 
direct productivity-enhancing policies during the period of 1953-1961. 
The trend continued even after the formal launching of Five-Year Economic 
Development Plan in 1962. From 1962 to 1981, most of productivity-enhancing 
policies were of the second type: targeting strategic export-promoting sector, 
designating certain areas as Export Processing Zone (EPZ), and series of trade 
policies designed to promote export industries. There was very little policy attempt to 
improve R&D facilities and technology adoption until the early 1980’s. 
As reviewed before, Korea was basically an agricultural economy by early 
1960’s.According to my long-run data base of Korea (Pyo, 2001), the share of the 
primary sector (Agriculture, Fishery and Forestry) in total value added has changed: 
62.6 % (1911), 47.1 % (1938), 40.4 % (1953) and 41.1 % (1961). The share of the 
primary sector in total employment is estimated to have changed: 87.4 % (1911), 
82.5 % (1938), 70.4 % (1953) and 64.2 % (1961). 
The episode of productivity change has begun by a concerted effort of 
government and private sector. After the Rhee government was toppled by student 
demonstration on April 19, 1960, a weak cabinet government was formed but 
economic and political instability followed until President Park consolidated power 
through a military coup on May 16, 1961. The Park government was very weak in 
legitimacy and therefore, had to establish themselves by solving nation’s economic 
hardship and eliminating poverty. They announced a series of economic stabilization 
measures including Freezing of High-interest Loans to farmers and fishery households 
on May 25, 1961. By the measure, farmers and fishers were supposed to pay back 
their loans to National Agricultural Cooperative Federation (public bank) at reduced 
 34annual interest rate (12 %) over extended period of time (5 years). In turn, National 
Agricultural Cooperative Federation issued Agriculture Finance Bond to lenders 
which were supposed to be paid back at 20 % annual interest rate over 4 year-period 
after a one-year grace period. Under the measure, a total of 53.7 billion Hwan was 
registered as high-interest loans and 29.6 billion Hwan was ruled as eligible loans and 
23.7 billion Hwan was paid back through the bond. Since at the time farmers and 
fishers were trapped by high-interest (at times over 40 %) curb-market loans which 
they had incurred as operating expense and child education fees etc., the measure was 
taken as a significant relief to them and became instrumental in their mobility to 
manufacturing sector. 
The Economic Planning Board (EPB) was established in July 1961 as up-scaled 
Ministry independent of Ministry of Finance specializing in drafting and 
administering economic development plans and it was also given budgeting power 
and supervising role of public enterprises. The Deputy Prime Minister was appointed 
to head EPB and the planning and implementation of economic development plan was 
centralized. EPB drafted the First Five-year Economic Development Plan (FEDP) by 
end of 1961 and announced on January 5, 1962. Under the plan, two-types of 
industries were chosen as strategic industries. One is labor-intensive manufacturing 
sector such as plywood, wigs, simple assembly of home electronics and textile & 
apparel which have best potential for exports. The other is so-called basic industries 
for constructing infrastructure and providing basic materials for other industries such 
as steel & iron, cement, and electric power plants etc. which are import-substitutes. 
During the First (1962-1966) and Second Five-year Economic Development 
Plan (1967-1971), the industrial restructuring has taken the form of inter-industry 
transformation mostly migration from Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery to Mining 
and Manufacturing and Services. When the first oil crisis shocked the country in 1974, 
the Korean government started realizing that exports of simple assembled 
manufactures may become no longer viable. In addition to material and intermediate 
product cost-inflation due to quadrupled oil prices, there was a substantial wage 
increase as the Korean economy passed Lewisian turning point around 1975 ending a 
period of unlimited labor supply. 
According to Nurkse (1961), if the source of growth of an economy lies in the 
growth of a factor, one of the most important tasks is to allocate the factor to the 
industries with “incremental comparative advantage”. Nurkse (1961, P.308) made 
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becomes necessary as soon as we apply the central concept of international trade 
theory to the problem of economic growth. After distinguishing between two types of 
industrialization, export promotion of manufactured goods to industrial countries and 
production for domestic markets, he then argued:  
“It is to make use of growing resources which cannot with comparative 
advantage be absorbed by expansion in the traditional sectors that industrialization 
becomes really necessary. We therefore envisage industrial activities, whether for 
export or for home use, as being set up on top of the existing export sectors, so long 
as in these sectors a country still enjoys a high “established” comparative 
advantage even though, as a consequence of sluggish expansion of external 
demand, its “incremental “ comparative advantage in these lines may be low.” 
In other words, it is necessary to view comparative advantage in a dynamic setting for 
development strategy based on export promotion through industrialization. In case of 
Korea, the inter-industry transformation in the form of migration from traditional 
sector to Manufacturing has taken place during the period of 1962-1974. Then it was 
substituted by intra-manufacturing transformation and restructuring during the period 
of 1975-1979 from unskilled labor-intensive industries to skilled-labor intensive 
industries and more capital-intensive industries. This restructuring was provoked by 
the first oil crisis in 1973-74. 
The second restructuring was carried out mainly during 1980’s in order to 
rectify some of the investments which were ill-conceived or mismanaged. After 
President Park was assassinated in October 1979, there was a brief period of political 
instability and also the second oil crisis in 1980 followed. The growth rate of real 
GDP dropped from 9.3 percent in 1978 and 6.8 percent in 1979 to – 1.5 percent in 
1980. The regime of President Chun coming from military background also had to 
seek a political legitimacy by improving economic conditions. One of the policy 
doctrines by President Chun was to follow President Park’s principle of keeping 
economic policies independent of political and military influence. Most of major 
economic policy decisions were left to expert bureaucrats who had decided that there 
was a need to carry out a major industrial restructuring and reduce foreign debt.  
During the period of 1975-79, some of the conglomerates carried out pre-
emptive investments in heavy and chemical industries such as automobile, 
shipbuilding, cement, iron and steel, and refinery and petrochemical industries 
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industries to heavy and chemical industries. Many of such projects had become white-
elephants in early 1980’s and no longer viable. Some of the major conglomerates had 
to give up several projects and consolidation of excessive investment had become 
inevitable. The government initiated restructuring through government-controlled 
banks such as Korea Development Bank which had provided loans to major heavy 
and chemical industries projects. 
During the period of 1980’s there were some important policy shifts to help 
restructuring economy. The first shift was to promote technology-intensive industries 
after learning lessons from over-investing in heavy and chemical capital-intensive 
industries. From early 1980’s Samsung entered into semi-conductor investments and 
Lucky-Goldstar (LG) and Hyundai followed Samsung. The second shift was made by 
Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MCI) which changed industrial support policy 
from direct support system to indirect support system. For example, in the 1970’s 
MCI tried to identify so-called strategic export sector and promoted the industry by 
providing various incentive tax-cum subsidy system and easy access to loans by 
government controlled banks. But in the 1980’s the direct support system was slowly 
replaced by indirect support system. For example, there was R&D support system and 
investment tax credit system for investments in energy-saving machinery and 
equipments and facilities. The third shift was to move toward import liberalization in 
commodity markets as documented in Pyo (1990). The trade liberalization effort in 
the 1980’s had provided a significant incentive for industrial restructuring by reducing 
inflationary pressure and therefore, reducing financial distortion which existed in the 
form of the gap between official bank lending rate and unofficial curb-market rate. 
The third industrial restructuring was made as a consequence of IMF bail-out 
measure after the December 1977 financial crisis. As documented in IMF (2003), it 
was a basically twin-crisis: a combination of domestic banking crisis and foreign 
exchange crisis. Under the system of IMF mandated bail-out, Korean industries had to 
go through a massive restructuring. As I have outlined in Pyo (2004), in 1997 there 
were thirteen Chaebols out of top-thirty Chaebols that went under court-supervised 
restructuring. The fundamental cause of the 1997 crisis in Korea was pre-emptive 
over-investments by major conglomerates while there was a significant reduction in 
rates of return. As I defined in Pyo (2000), it was the failure of excess competition 
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supervision. 
The excess competition occurred not because chaebols were not interested in 
profits but because they began to realize that their protected market and regulatory 
regime was being threatened by the change in political economy between the 
government and chaebols and by increased foreign competition through full-scale 
trade and financial liberalization by Korea’s accession to WTO and OECD. The 
change in political economy was inevitable because Korea was going through a very 
turbulent period of democratization in transition from quasi-military authoritarian 
regimes of Presidents Chun(1981-1987) and Roh (1988-1992) to a truly civilian 
government of President Kim (1993-1997). The transition implies a transformation 
from a strong government with more control power to a weaker government with less 
control power. In other words the alliance between the government and big business 
through exchange of political contribution and favoritism has been weakened creating 
an environment where chaebols are no longer well-protected in their respective 
markets. And the impending foreign competition had accentuated this trend and had 
made many conglomerates impatient and nervous and caused them to over-react or 
over-invest recklessly. 
The industrial restructuring after 1998 has taken form of M&A and big-deals 
among troubled major conglomerates. In addition, as IT boom followed after the 
financial crisis, Korean industries have invested in IT sector and venture capital. But 
the investment stagnation was followed and therefore, the long-run prospect of 
productivity growth is quite uncertain at this point. After a massive restructuring in 
the form of cuts in employment and working hours, the labor productivity has 
improved but the overall gain in total factor productivity is not observed yet. But the 
recovery after the crisis was made possible by some productivity gain through 
industrial restructuring under IMF- mandated programs. 
In summary, the episode of rapid productivity convergence in Korea was made 
possible by successful adoption of development strategy based on incremental 
comparative advantage and industrial restructuring by the government initiative. It 
was a consequence of interaction between market forces and government intervention.   
 
  Technology Policy and Competitive Environment 
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education. It has also pursued egalitarian social and economic policies which may 
have helped the productivity growth.  
The constant inflow of scientists and engineers from abroad was made 
possible as Korea’s economic development passed the Lewisian turning-point in 
mid-1970s and since then followed the sustainable long-term high-growth. In the 
background of such constant inflow lies the mass-education but a very competitive 
education system. In such a social environment, promoting one’s human capital was 
commensurate with promoting one’s physical and financial wealth. 
On the other hand in terms of industrial policy, the government has 
deliberately introduced limited competition by lowering entry barriers over time and 
by monitoring market failures by major conglomerates in order to maximize 
efficiency of limited resources as I have outlined in Pyo (2000). In other words, the 
government has played the role of competition promoter and supervisor through 
government-controlled banks which are part of quasi-internal organization. In this 
regard, the system has promoted monopolistic competition across industries. That is 
why one observes in Korea a larger number of automobile manufacturers, 
telecommunication equipment producers, mobile phone companies and so on than 
those normally observed in many developing countries or smaller advanced 
countries. For example, in automobiles there were at least three producers and in 
electronics there were always more than three competitors. In case of 
semiconductor industry, Samsung entered to the market in the early 1980’s 
following the Japanese semiconductor manufacturers. But then the Korean 
government allowed market entry by Lucky-Gold Star (LG) and Hyundai to 
promote the competition. Such an example is not limited to export industries. The 
monopoly of Korean Airline Group in airline business was broken when 
government allowed the second airline’s (Asiana) market entry in mid 1980’s. In 
case of mobile telecommunication, the government tried to break the monopoly of 
SK in cellular phone service by issuing another license to a cellular operator called 
Shinsegi and then introduced further competition issuing licenses to three PCS 
service providers. The bureaucrats wanted to avoid such blame that they are bribed 
or lobbied by a certain business conglomerate. 
Together with abundant reserve labor force with minimum education level, the 
social environment in a relatively egalitarian state seems to have interacted 
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in Pyo (1996), the ruling class in the colonial period was discredited after gaining 
independence from Japan and most of land owners lost power after the land reform 
in 1949 and the subsequent Korean War. The social environment in early 1960’s of 
Korea was pretty much a classless society in which average household regarded a 
better education for their children as best investment for upward social mobility. 
The Confucian tradition in favor of education must have acted positively too but it 
should be noted that the household’s choice of educational investment was a 
rational economic choice rather than a cultural or religious one. The parents have 
expected higher rates of return on education of their children because in a classless 
society, upward social mobility is determined by education. 
While there was a strong notion that Korea started off in the early 1960’s as a 
relatively egalitarian society, the rapid accumulation of capital after the launching 
of development plan could have made income distribution worse than before. There 
are no reliable statistics of income distribution in 1970’s and early 1980’s. The 
Family Income and Expenditure Survey by National Statistical Office provide index 
of concentration (Gini Coefficient) starting from 1985 and Urban Wage Earners’ 
Households Income from 1993. These two sources of income distribution statistics 
show a conflicting pattern. The former Gini coefficient has improved from 0.345 in 
1985 to 0.295 in 1996 just before Korea’s financial crisis of 1997 as shown in 
Appendix Table. On the other hand, the latter Gini coefficient has deteriorated from 
0.281 in 1993 to 0.291 in 1996 and 0.317 in 2000. The latter Gini coefficient seems 
more reliable because it reflects the impact of a financial crisis on income 
distribution: in general, a financial crisis worsens income distribution because of 
increase in unemployment and high interest policy ensuing after the crisis which 
makes the rich richer and the poor poorer because the former has financial assets 
while the latter has financial debts. 
Korea-specific factors such as historic legacy coming from the Japanese 
Colonial Period (1910-1945) and the division of the Korean peninsula and the 
resulting national preoccupation with security issues should be addressed. Political 
environment and security issues should be added to provide broader picture of 
Korea’s unique development history.  
Defense budget in Korean government expenditure occupied 53.7 percent in 
1953, 35.0 percent in 1960, 20.0 percent in 1990 and 11.2 percent in 1999. At the 
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was an overhang to the economy. At times, the constant confrontation with North 
Korea was used as a means of political suppression by authoritarian regimes and 
suppression on union movements. However, the security issue has had some 
positive aspects in lifting up overall productivity of the economy. For example, 
national conscription system might have deprived from Korean youths of their 
opportunity to advance the next ladder of learning and training but it also provided 
them a minimum general education to read and write and most of all a discipline as 
workforce. 
The vent-for-surplus type supply of labor force has been the cornerstone of 
Korea’s rapid industrialization. But it was only a part of necessary conditions. There 
must have been interaction in a market economy between government and 
entrepreneurs. The government established after a military coup by President Park 
in 1961 lacked the legitimacy as a democratically elected government. Therefore, 
they sought for restoring the popularity of their regime by carrying out economic 
development plans successfully. In other words, their political stability depended on 
economic prosperity and most of all they had to create jobs for the urban 
unemployed and the vast disguised unemployed in the rural sector. 
 
The experience of the second oil shock and the first negative growth in 1980 in the 
political instability followed after the assassination of President Park had made the 
entire HCI plans reevaluated. The turning point in Korea’s industrial policy came in 
1983 when the government switched from direct industrial promotion to indirect and 
functional support system. In other words, the new industrial support system was 
designed to avoid sector-specific industrial promotion and targeting strategy and to 
introduce more competition through import liberalization. Under the new paradigm of 
industrial policy, for example instead of supporting specific industries such as cement 
and steel manufacturing, the government supported investments in energy-saving 
machinery and equipments by a variety of financial-incentive and tax-incentive 
system. At the same time, the relative importance in industrial targeting was switched 
from capital-intensive industries to technology-intensive industries. Samsung started 
investing semi-conductor manufacturing in order to catch up Japanese firms and the 
Korean government allowed LG and Hyundai to enter into semi-conductor market to 
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promote technology-intensive industries. 
As a conclusion on the link between government policy and productivity 
enhancement, the episode of Korea provides us with clear evidence on the positive 
role of government in promoting productivity through both direct policies such as 
public R&D expenditure and indirect policies based upon subsidies and other 
incentive systems. But the set of government policies aimed at promoting 
productivity needs to be coordinated in terms of timing and internal check and 
balance. The implementation of such policies at the right timing is one of the most 
important aspects. For example, high educational capacity can be a necessary 
condition but not a sufficient condition for large-scale public R&D expenditure. At 
the beginning of industrial development, technological diffusion rather than 
technological innovation could be more important and practical so that large-scale 
public R&D can be launched at a later stage of development when R&D 
infrastructure is built and there arises genuine motivation for indigenous R&D effort 
as Korea waited until early 1980’s.  
 
The Political Economy and Institutional Aspects of Technology Policy 
In order to promote competition among big firms, the Fair Trade Act was 
introduced in October 1971. In 1981, Fair Trade Commission designated a total of 
666 firms in 14 industries as restricted from forming cartels. In June 1985, the 
government required Chaebols  to register their cartels in order to avoid their 
excessive concentration power. At the present time, Fair Trade Commission remains 
as a powerful watchdog to large conglomerates and Chaebols. 
The transition from authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regime to a democratic 
one was far from being smooth. At times Korea had to go through a very turbulent 
period both politically and economically. As I observed in Pyo (2000), a 
distinguishing feature of export-led growth in Korea was its unique industrial 
structure. The government policy protected bureaucrats from accusations of being 
linked to one or two conglomerates’ interest but, at the same time, provided big 
conglomerates with irresistible incentives for horizontal diversification. The 
phenomenon of ‘too big to be failed’ set in because big conglomerates themselves 
were stockholders of many financial institutions and the moral hazard in financial 
institutions started eroding their competitiveness. The top 30 conglomerates were 
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much as one-third of the country’s total production. 
The business groups called ‘chaebol’ in Korea many look quite similar to the 
Japanese ‘zaibatsu’, but they are different in many respects. First, Korean chaebols 
had to rely on developing the export market more intensively than the Japanese firms 
because their domestic market size was less than 5 per cent of the Japanese domestic 
market size in 1975 (US$20.9 billion, as against US$499 billion, in term of GNP) and 
less than 9 per cent in 1995 (US$ 453 billion, as against $5156 billion, in terms of 
GNP). As a result, there could coexist in Japan two types of zaibatsu: one is a highly 
specialized technology leader in multinational markets (for example, Toyota, Sony 
and Toshiba) and the other is a business group of horizontally diversified firms (for 
example, Mitsubishi group, Mitsui group, Sumitomo group and Fuji group). But, in 
Korea, only the latter type (for example, Samsung, Hyundai and Lucky-Goldstar) 
could be established because specialization was riskier than diversification under the 
oligopolistic setting with the government regulation on entry and exit. In addition, 
diversification through cross-shareholding could generate higher economies of scale 
in a limited domestic market.  
Second, the way the business groups are governed in Korea is quite different 
from that in Japan. As a result of dissolution of zaibatsu under the MacArthur 
administration, there were few dominant family groups which could own and manage 
zaibatsu. The corporate ownership structure in Japan is a more diversified one than 
that in Korea and the role of institutional investors is much more important in Japan 
than in Korea. As a result, the decision-making process and the corporate governance 
in Japan are much more consensus-based than those in Korea. Such a difference in 
ownership structure and governing pattern could make a substantial difference to the 
outcome of the excess competition because a more consensus-based system can 
survive better than an authoritarian owner-management system at the time of policy 
failure and can protect itself from overextension through a built-in system of checks 
and balances. 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
Since the early 1990’s the model of monopolistic competition across industries 
in Korea has been subject to change both domestically and internationally. First of all, 
the so-called ‘Lipset phenomenon’ has arrived on the sociopolitical scene of Korea, as 
 43outlined in Pyo (1993). The country’s success in export-led growth had brought about 
increasing demands for democracy and the transition from an authoritarian regime to 
a democratic one has been turbulent rather than smooth. The increasing demand for 
higher wages and benefits by organized labor through, at times, violent disputes and 
strikes had placed an extra burden on firms’ efforts at restructuring and ‘downsizing’. 
But most important of all, in the face of increasing domestic and foreign competition, 
some monopolistic competitors had carried out a series of ill-fated pre-emptive 
strategic investments. As anticipated in Pyo et al, (1996), the potential impacts of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO) in a general equilibrium context had become much 
greater than those in a partial equilibrium context. One typical manifestation of such 
impacts was over-investment in non-tradable sectors and pre-emptive investment in 
some tradable sectors.  
Considering the current market trend towards deregulation and privatization, it 
was difficult for the government to discourage the entry. Even though it did not 
materialize owing to the objections by the government and the subsequent financial 
turmoil, we could have seen another pattern of oligopolistic competition in the steel 
industry, too. Many Korean firms in the automobile industry and the semiconductor 
industry tried to put themselves in strategic positions in the global market. They 
seemed to take the view that there was increasing demand for their products from 
emerging markets and transition economies. They regarded their products as not 
necessarily top-quality goods but as reasonably priced, competitive products in such 
markets.  
Their success or failure depended on their income-generating capacities 
because they had to pay back interests and principals of the loans they had borrowed 
from domestic and foreign banks. This game of high-yield high-risk in strategic 
markets was to determine the substantiality of export-led growth in Korea. Such a 
game could not have been maintained if there was no moral hazard in the financial 
sector and if the government was strong enough to insulate its bureaucrats from the 
distributive politics among chaebols and other interest groups, including labor unions. 
But neither condition was met. In addition, the owner-management corporate 
governance without consensus building and internal checks and balances resulted in 
over-investment in existing business and caused excessive competition against a 
background of moral hazard in the financial sector and lax banking supervision by 
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financial crisis in Korea. 
A recent report by the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) of the IMF (2003) 
has characterized the financial crisis of 1997 in East Asia as a new type of balance of 
payments crisis which has been triggered by a massive capital inflows followed by a 
sudden capital outflows. In particular, the report has noted that the nature of the crisis 
in Korea and Indonesia was “twin crises” in which the external crisis coincided with a 
banking crisis. We can identify South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and the 
Philippines as five Asian-Crisis countries and Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, 
and China as other five East Asian non-crisis countries. 
The overall assessment on the macroeconomic performance by Asian-Crisis 
countries is that the rebound of growth over the period of 1999-2000 has slowed down 
in the subsequent period of 2001-2003 mainly because of stagnant demand for 
domestic investment across all crisis-inflicted economies. In particular, the domestic 
investment on Machinery and Equipment has been very disappointing. For example, 
in case of Korea, its average annual growth rate was 17 percent during the pre-crisis 
period of 1994-1996 and became negative during the crisis-years in 1997(- 9.6 %) and 
1998(- 42.3 %). Then the average annual growth rate has become explosively positive 
in 1999 (36.8 %) and 2000 (33.6 %) but suddenly has dropped in 2001 (-9.0 %), 2002 
(7.5 %) and 2003 (-1.2 %).  
There are two main issues at hand in examining the investment trend in the 
post-recovery period in Asian-Crisis countries. One issue is whether the stagnation in 
investment is a permanent phenomenon and, therefore, the period of “East Asian 
Miracle” is over. The other issue is why the volatility of investment is so large during 
the post-crisis period of 1999-2003. 
Economic development and late industrialization is often a complex interaction 
between endogenous historical heritages and imported institutional elements. It 
involves more than mechanical income-growth dynamics. Therefore, we want to go 
beyond the traditional explanations of the determinants of free market system and 
search for more cultural and historical aspects. The reason is that without expanding 
the boundaries of our research, we may not be able explain for the rising sentiments of 
anti-market movements and pro-socialist policy doctrines under increasingly 
unwarranted egalitarianism in recent years in Korea. 
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think that the remarkable achievement of growth is mainly due to either government’s 
planning or work-ethics of the ordinary workers, without realizing the role of 
entrepreneur for finding the business opportunities. They regarded free-enterprise 
system is basically implanted system and viewed it as free-good in a capitalist society. 
In recent years, while there are ample evidences of benefits of free enterprise system, 
some anti-market and anti-business sentiments have been growing among civil 
activists, intellectuals, and union leaders. We have begun to realize that free enterprise 
system is not free. 
The free enterprise system and entrepreneurship is like two sides of coin: 
without one, the other cannot survive. As I argued before, one of the main reasons 
why Korea could grow so fast under dictatorship is because the dictatorship was 
relatively less-corrupted and it pursued export promotion maintaining a certain degree 
of transparency in who gets what and how. Through this system the entrepreneurship 
in Korea could be nurtured making one of the most successful story of late 
industrialization. 
The current situation would become worse, as many international consulting 
organizations ascribe the poor performance in national competitiveness to 
environment and institutions hostile to business activities. This hostile environment 
inside Korea is a fatal problem for further growth, as international economies become 
more integrated: Korean firms tend to stop investing domestically and foreign 
investments do not flow into Korea.   
In order to resume sustainable growth and renew the productivity convergence  
Korea needs to find a new paradigm of technological advancement and growth-
oriented system under drastically changed social and political landscapes. The Korean 
economy has been struggling in finding such a path under a non-authoritarian regime. 
It may take much longer time than expected because under the current mode of 
globalization, relying on market mechanism seems to be the only solution for a small 
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 49Appendix                        
 
 
Table A1 Major Social and Economic Indicators of Korea (1960-2000) 
 
Social and Economic Indicators  1953  1960  1980  2000 
1. Population Trend (In thousand persons)   
Census Enumeration  24,989 37,436  46,136
Household (In thousand)  4,371 7,969 
Average number of member (In persons)  5.6 4.5 
Estimates of midyear population  20,527
2 25,012 38,124 47,008
Male  10,083
1 12,551 19,236 23,667
Female  10,443
1 12,462 18,888 23,341
Sex ratio (per 100 female)  96.6
1 100.7 101.8 101.4
Population density (persons per sq.Km)  208.5
1 254.1 385.1 472.6
2. Summary of Economically Active Population   
Population 15-year old and over  14,551
3 24,463 36,139






Non-economically active population  6,321
2 10,032 14,189
Unemployment rate (%)  8.1
2 5.2 4.1
3. Employed Persons by Industry (%)   
Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  63.0
4 34.0 10.86








Wholesale & retail trade, restaurants & hotels  19.2  27.2
Transport, storage & communication  4.5  6.0
Finance, Insurance, Real estate & Business, service 2.4  9.9
4. National Income (At current prices)   
GNI (Billion US $)  1.4
5 1.9 60.9 635.4
GDP (Billion US $)  1.3 2.0 62.2  457.4
Per Capita GNI (US $)  67
6 79 1,598 9,628








Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  8.0
7 -2.1
8 -20.0 2.0












Producers of government and non-profit services   4.4  0.3
Social and Economic Indicators  1953  1960  1980  2000 
6. Production Structure (% at current price)   




5 Gross National Products 
6 Per Capita GNP 
7 Series at 1995 constant prices 
8 1954 
9 Gross National Products 
 50Agriculture, Forestry and Fishing  47.3 36.8 14.7  4.7
Mining and Manufacturing  10.1 15.9 29.7  31.6
Manufacturing 9.0 13.8 28.2  31.3
Electricity, gas and water  2.6 4.1 10.1  10.8
Services 40.0 43.2 36.0  43.1
Producers of government and non-profit services  9.5  9.8
Industrial Structure   
Light Industries  78.9 76.6 46.4  22.3
Heavy and Chemical Industries  21.1 23.4 53.6  77.7
7. Gross Output and Value-added of Manufacturing  
    (In billion Won, %)   
Gross Output   
Manufacturing 25.3
10 59.7 36,279.0 564,834.1












































Chemical products, refined petroleum products, 

































Fabricated metal products Machinery  






















Value-added   
Manufacturing 21.9 11,856.60  219,424.60
































Chemical products, refined petroleum products, 









































Social and Economic Indicators  1953  1960  1980  2000 
8. Savings ratio and Investment ratio (%)   
Gross savings ratio  13.1 9.0 24.4  32.4
Private 11.1 5.0 19.1  19.3
Domestic gross investment ratio  14.7 10.0 36.2  28.3
Domestic gross fixed investment ratio  6.9 9.9 34.0  28.5
Ratio of Investment to abroad  -1.6 0.4 -8.5 
Ratio of Exports and Imports to GNI   11.7 16.0 80.3  90.3
Exports   3.2 4.1 34.6  46.4
                                                 
10 1955 
 51Imports 9.8 12.7 45.8  43.9
9. Electric Power (In GWh, %)   



























Power sold  1,154 32,734 239,535
Consumption per capita (Kwh)  46 859 5,067
10. Number of Registered Motor Vehicles (In thousand)   
Total  12.8 30.8 527.7 12,059.30
Passenger cars  3.7 128 249.1 8,083.90
(Composition ratio)  (28.6) (41.5) (47.2) 









Buses  2.2 4.2 42.5 1,427.2
Special car  0.2 0.4 9.2 37.1
Number of Licensed Drivers  1,860.7 18,697.3
11. Communication System and Number of subscribers   
Number of communication systems (In thousand)  26 108 2,835  23,841
11
Analog 26 108 2,815 
Digital  20  23,841
10
Number of telephone subscribers (In thousand)  23 87 2,705  21,932
Business  971 
Households  1,734 
Telephone subscribers per 100 people (%)  0.3 7.1  47.5
Number of public telephone (In Each)  609 58,017  539,983
12. Overseas Direct Investments (In million US$)   
Total permitted  250.7
12
Total invested  145.2
11   3,668.2
South-east Asia  52.9
11   829.7
North America  32.7
11   1,159.4
Europe  5.2
11   142.1
Liquidation etc.  18.2
11   191.3
Net invested  127.0
11   3,476.9
Investment outstanding  127.0
11   25,816.3











United Kingdom  10.5
12 2.3 84.3
France   607.2
Netherlands  1.8 1,768.4
Social and Economic Indicators  1953  1960  1980  2000 
14. Elementary School   
Number of School  4,033 4,496 6,487  5,267
Number of Students  2,259,313 3,622,685 5,658,002 4,019,991
Female students (%)  48.5 
Enrollment ratio  99.8 102.9  98.7
Number of Teachers  35,059 61,605 119,064  140,000
Female teachers (%)  22.0 36.8 
Number of Students per teacher  64.4 58.8 47.5  28.7
Number of Students in a class  57.6 57.0 51.5  35.8
15. Advance Rate of Graduates to Higher School Level (%)   




 52Advance Rate of primary school Graduates to middle 
school  95.8 99.9
Male  97.4 99.9
Female  94.1 99.9
Advance Rate of middle school Graduates to high 
school  70.2
14 84.5 99.6
Male  87.5 99.6
Female  80.8 99.6
Advance Rate of high school Graduates to higher 
education  29.8
13 23.7 68.0
Male  24.5 
Female  22.5 
16. Composition of Population by Education Attainment 
     (25 Years Old & Over, %)   















Female   2.0
14 6.6
15 16.5 14.3
High school Graduates  1.7
14 5.6
15 18.9 39.4
Male   2.7
14 8.5
15 25.4 41.6
Female   0.7
14 2.9
15 12.9 37.3
College, University Graduates and Over  1.3
14 3.7
15 7.7 24.3






17. Private Institutes (In each, person)
   
Institutes 1,136
17 5,023 57,935
Liberal arts & sciences course  214
16 381 14,043
Art course  193
16 1,485 26,160




Liberal arts & sciences course  117,618  1,388,333
Art course  52,808 987,610
Management business field  123,922  565,350
Instructors  13,332 135,637
Social and Economic Indicators  1953  1960  1980  2000 
18. Public Education Cost per capita 
      (In thousand won)   
Elementary Schools  4.7
18 118.5 2,023
Middle Schools  9.5 17 157.2 2,690
High Schools  19.7 17 149.7 2,841
Junior colleges  53.0 17 708.0 3,095
National & Public  50.4 17 893.3 2,471.0
19
Teacher’s College  44.2 17 1,114.0 6,449
College & university  68.3 17 1,036.3 5,526
National & Public  93.3 17 1,198.2  4,673.8
18
19. Institutions and Personnel Engaged in R&D   
Research activity performance Institutions  72
20 647 4,635
Research Institutes  124  173
University & College  202  268
Companies  321 4,194
Researchers  1,750
19 18,434 159,973
                                                 







 53Research Institutes  4,598 
University & College  8,695  50,155
Companies   5,141 70,431
Researchers per 10,000  0.6
19 4.8 




Ratio to GDP (%)  0.24
20 0.97  
21 2.67
Basic research 




















21. Water supply   
Water supply (In thousand)  3,451
23 4,210 20,809 41,774
Water supply ratio (%)  16.8 54.6  87.1
Capacity (In thousand ton per day)  240
22 517 6,756 26,980
Water supply per person a day (litter)  65
22 99 256 380
Number of Regions with Water Supply (In each)  50
22 58 243 861
22. Distribution of Income ( Gini Coefficient)   
Family and Expenditure Survey  0.345  0.295
Urban Wage Earners’ Households  0.291  0.317
23. Labor Union   
Number of Unit unions                                                         2,141  5,698
Union Members (1,000 persons)  967  1,527
Union Membership Rate (%)  20.8  12.0
Number of Labor Dispute Cases  1,873  250
Working Days Lost(Days)  5,400,837  1,893,563
Sources: Korea National Statistical Office, Social Indicators in Korea (2001), Korea Statistical 
Yearbook (2001), and Changes in Social and Economic Life in Korea during last Five 
Decades (1998)  
 
                                                 
21 1963 
22 1983 
23 1954 
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